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SURVEY OF NEW YORK PRACTICE

CPLR 303: Commencement of federal action in New York does not
result in designation of attorney as agent for service of process in
state court action
Under CPLR 303,11 "[tihe commencement of an action in the
state by a person not subject to personal jurisdiction" creates an
implied designation of the nondomiciliary's attorney as agent for
service of process. 1 Available only to a party to the original action,42
CPLR 303 (Supp. 1978-1979) provides in part:
The commencement of an action in the state by a person not subject to personal jurisdiction is a designation by him of his attorney appearing in the action
• . . as agent, during the pendency of the action, for service of a summons pursuant
to section 308, in any separate action in which such a person is a defendant and
another party to the action is a plaintiff if such separate action would have been
permitted as a counterclaim had the action been brought in the supreme court.
CPLR 303 was amended in 1972 to allow service pursuant to CPLR 308. Ch. 487, [19721 N.Y.
Laws 1819 (McKinney). See The Quarterly Survey, 47 ST. JoHN's L. Rav. 148, 157 (1972).
Thus, in addition to personal service within the state, the alternative methods of service
under CPLR 308 are now available. See CPLR 308(2)-(5) (Supp. 1978-1979). Prior to this
amendment, only personal service on the attorney was valid. See Twentieth Century-Fox
Film Corp. v. Dupper, 33 App. Div. 2d 682, 305 N.Y.S.2d 918 (1st Dep't 1969) (mem.),
discussed in The Quarterly Survey, 44 ST. JoHN's L. Rav. 758, 773 (1970). For a general
discussion of CPLR 303, see 1 WK&M
303.01-.08.
1' CPLR 303 (Supp. 1978-1979). A nonresident who voluntarily attends judicial proceedings in the state as a party or a witness, and is not otherwise subject to in personam jurisdiction, is generally granted immunity from service of process. See Thermoid Co. v. Fabel, 4
N.Y.2d 494, 151 N.E.2d 883, 176 N.Y.S.2d 331 (1958); Netograph Mfg. Co. v. Scrugham, 197
N.Y. 377, 90 N.E. 962 (1910). If attendance is mandatory, however, and there would be a
penalty for not appearing, no immunity is granted. See New England Indus., Inc. v. Margiotti, 270 App. Div. 488, 60 N.Y.S.2d 430 (1st Dep't), aff'd per curiam, 296 N.Y. 722, 70
N.E.2d 540 (1946); Barbella v. Yale, 4 Misc. 2d 825, 152 N.Y.S.2d 695 (Sup. Ct. Bronx County
1956).
The immunity privilege is granted to suitors and witnesses by the court to promote an
efficient judicial system through voluntary participation. See Bunce v. Humphrey, 214 N.Y.
21, 108 N.E. 95 (1915); Parker v. Marco, 136 N.Y. 585, 32 N.E. 989 (1893); Chauvin v. Dayon,
14 App. Div. 2d 146, 217 N.Y.S.2d 795 (3d Dep't 1961); Cake v. Haight, 30 Misc. 386, 63
N.Y.S. 1043 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1900). There is, however, no constitutional requirement
that immunity be given. See Zirinsky v. Zirinsky, 77 Misc. 2d 954, 356 N.Y.S.2d 414 (Sup.
Ct. N.Y. County 1974). In fact, some courts have denied immunity to a person voluntarily
attending an action closely related to the action in which jurisdiction is sought to be acquired.
See, e.g., Lamb v. Schmitt, 285 U.S. 222 (1932); Roth v. W.T. Cowan, Inc., 103 F. Supp. 203
(E.D.N.Y. 1952); Zirinsky v. Zirinsky, 77 Misc. 2d 954, 356 N.Y.S.2d 414 (Sup. Ct. N.Y.
County 1974). For an excellent critique of the immunity privilege, see Keeffe & Roscia,
Immunity and Sentimentality, 32 CoRNE L.Q. 471 (1947).
The designation of the nonresident's attorney as agent for service of process under CPLR
303 does not act to remove the personal immunity granted to the nonresident plaintiff. See
Landsman v. Rabinowitz, 208 Misc. 126, 144 N.Y.S.2d 241 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1955). But
see Resort Airlines, Inc. v. Sternberg, 208 Misc. 383, 144 N.Y.S.2d 70 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County
1955). Nevertheless, since valid service may be made on the attorney, CPLR 303 operates to
curtail the immunity privilege. The agency designation of the attorney exists during the
pendency of the nonresident's action. Service may be made only from the time that the action
is commenced to the moment a final judgment is entered. See Banco de Brasil v. Madison
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this procedure is limited to a separate action that "would have been
permitted as a counterclaim had the [first] action been brought in
the supreme court."43 Recently, in Rockwood National Corp. v.
Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co.," the Appellate Division, Second
Department, construed CPLR 303 to extend only to actions instituted in state court and thus found it inapplicable when the nonresident's original action was commenced in federal court.45
In Rockwood, shareholders of Rockwood National Corp. (Rockwood) brought an action in the District Court for the Southern
District of New York alleging violations of federal securities laws by
Durick and Siegel, two of its corporate officers, and its auditor,
Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co. (PMM).46 In this action, Durick and
Siegel cross-claimed against PMM, disclaiming all liability.47 In a
S.S. Corp., 61 Misc. 2d 1028, 307 N.Y.S.2d 341 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1970); Concourse Super
Serv. Station, Inc. v. Price, 33 Misc. 2d 503, 226 N.Y.S.2d 651 (Sup. Ct. Bronx County 1962).
42 In accord with CPLR 105(b) (1972), courts have construed actions under CPLR 303 to
include special proceedings. See Hurwitz v. Bernard Assocs. Number Three, Inc., 30 Misc.
2d 512, 219 N.Y.S.2d 531 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1961). The commencement of criminal
proceedings are not included within the scope of CPLR 303. See Mount Everest Strawberry
Co. v. Chapron, 29 Misc. 2d 390, 218 N.Y.S.2d 30 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1961); Krooks v.
Krooks, 2 Misc. 2d 890, 150 N.Y.S.2d 268 (Sup. Ct. Westchester County 1956). Similarly,
CPLR 303 does not extend to arbitration proceedings, see Knickerbocker Ins. Co. v. Gilbert,
28 N.Y.2d 57, 268 N.E.2d 758, 320 N.Y.S.2d 12 (1971); Titan Research & Dev. Corp. v.
Doeller, 30 Misc. 2d 835, 217 N.Y.S.2d 726 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1961), unless leave of the
court is required to compel or stay arbitration. See Gillespie & Co. v. Coleport Fabrics, Inc.,
48 Misc. 2d 333, 264 N.Y.S.2d 653 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1965). Commencement of an action
by an assignee will not permit service upon the assignor of a claim unless the former is acting
solely as an agent for the latter. Segal Lock & Hardware Co. v. Markey, 124 N.Y.S.2d 181
(Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1953).
11 CPLR 303 (Supp. 1978-1979). CPLR 303 extends to any claim that could have been
brought as a counterclaim in New York supreme court. Id. CPLR 3019, which governs counterclaims, states that a counterclaim "may be any cause of action in favor of" a defendant
against a plaintiff. CPLR 3019(a) (1974). Thus, the separate CPLR 303 cause of action need
not be related to the subject matter of the original suit. Norry v. Land, 44 Misc. 2d 556, 254
N.Y.S.2d 176 (Sup. Ct. Monroe County 1964).
63 App. Div. 2d 978, 406 N.Y.S.2d 106 (2d Dep't 1978) (per curiam).
Id. at 978, 406 N.Y.S.2d at 107.
Id. at 978, 406 N.Y.S.2d at 106. The federal action was brought under section 10(b) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976). The plaintiffs alleged that
the financial statements of Rockwood National Corp. (Rockwood), prepared by Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co. (PMM), contained misrepresentations. Durick and Siegel were charged
with "aiding and abetting" the issuance of the false statements. Brief for Respondent at 3-4,
Rockwood Nat'l Corp. v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 63 App. Div. 2d 978, 406 N.Y.S.2d
106 (2d Dep't 1978) (per curiam). The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 specifies that the
federal district courts have exclusive jurisdiction in this type of action. 15 U.S.C. § 78aa
(1976).
,163 App. Div. 2d at 978, 406 N.Y.S.2d at 106. Durick and Siegel's cross-claim alleged
that PMM was solely responsible for any misrepresentations and any judgment for the plaintiffs should be fully borne by PMM. Brief for Respondent at 4, Reckwood Nat'l Corp. v. Peat
Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 63 App. Div. 2d 978, 406 N.Y.S.2d 106 (2d Dep't 1978) (per curiam).
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related action brought by Rockwood against PMM in the Supreme
Court, Westchester County, PMM counterclaimed against nonresidents Durick and Siegel and served their attorney with process."
PMM contended that the interposition of the cross-claim in the
federal suit subjected Durick and Siegel to in personam jurisdiction
pursuant to CPLR 303.11 Rejecting this argument, the lower court
dismissed the counterclaim for lack of personal jurisdiction.- °
In a unanimous, per curiam decision, the appellate division
affirmed.5 1 The court interpreted CPA 227-a, the predecessor of
CPLR 303, to be inapplicable to an action commenced in a federal
court located within New York. 2 Although the court found the language of CPLR 303 to be unclear, it believed that the legislature did
not intend to change prior law when it enacted the statute .3 Concluding that the commencement of an action in federal court does
not provide a basis upon which to serve a nondomiciliary's attorney
under CPLR 303, the Rockwood court declined to rule on whether a
broader reading of the statute would have been constitutionally
permissible. 4 In addition, the court did not indicate whether the
provisions of the statute would have applied if the original action
had been brought in state court. 5
Although some courts have intimated that the commencement
of a federal action is within the scope of CPLR 303,11 the Rockwood
,1 63 App. Div. 2d at 978, 406 N.Y.S.2d at 106. The state action was brought by Rockwood

National Corp. and two subsidiary corporations. Id. Alleging PMM negligently audited their
corporate records, the plaintiffs sought damages for accounting malpractice. Brief for Appel-

lant at 7, Rockwood Nat'l Corp. v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 63 App. Div. 2d 978, 406
N.Y.S.2d 106 (2d Dep't 1978) (per curiam). In its counterclaim, PMM alleged that Rockwood,

Durick, and Siegel concealed information and otherwise made false representations as to the
validity of the corporation's records. Brief for Appellant at 8-9.
' 63 App. Div. 2d at 978, 406 N.Y.S.2d at 106-07.
Id., 406 N.Y.S.2d at 106.
'

Id. The case was heard by Presiding Justice Gulotta and Justices Shapiro, Cohalan

and O'Connor.
52 63 App. Div. 2d at 978, 406 N.Y.S.2d at 107.
Id. Under CPA 227-a, "[tihe commencement of any action or proceeding in any court
of this state by any person not residing in this state shall be deemed a designation" of his
attorney as agent for service of process. Ch. 161, [1949] N.Y. Laws 342 (emphasis added).

In contrast, CPLR 303 provides that "[tihe commencement of an action in the state by a
[nonresident] is a designation" of his attorney for service of process. CPLR 303 (Supp. 1978-

1979) (emphasis added).
3163 App. Div. 2d at 978, 406 N.Y.S.2d at 107; see notes 64-66 and accompanying text

infra.
Id.; see notes 64-66 and accompanying text infra.
See, e.g., Kamhi v. Cohen, 512 F.2d 1051 (2d Cir. 1975); Banco de Brasil v. Madison
S.S. Corp., 61 Misc. 2d 1028, 307 N.Y.S.2d 341 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1970). See generally

WK&M 1 303.01.
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court appears correct in its assessment of the statute's legislative
history. CPA 227-a was directed to instances where a counterclaim
was stricken by the court, 57 or where a counterclaim could not be
interposed in a court of limited jurisdiction.5 8 Thus, the legislature
provided a means by which personal jurisdiction could be obtained
over a nondomiciliary who was immune from service of process,
thereby permitting defendants to adjudicate these claims in a separate action. In enacting CPA 227-a to deal with situations where
counterclaims could not be interposed, 9 it does not appear that the
legislature otherwise intended to abrogate the immunity generally
given to nonresidents who are parties to judicial proceedings in the
state. Furthermore, the Rockwood court correctly recognized that a
' Recommendation of the Law Revision Commission to the Legislature Relating to
Designation by a Non-Resident Plaintiff of Attorney as Agent to Receive Service of Process
in Separate Action or Proceeding, [1949] N.Y. LAW REv. COMM'N REP. 169 [hereinafter cited
as 1949 REPORT]; see CPA 262, ch. 324, [1936] N.Y. Laws 675.
111949 REPORT, supra note 57, at 200-01. The Report referred to the Municipal Court of
the City of New York which had no power to grant affirmative equitable relief as an example
of when a counterclaim could not be interposed in a court of limited jurisdiction. Thus, in
an action for breach of contract, the defendant could not counterclaim for reformation or
cancellation of the contract. Instead, he would have to commence a separate action in another
court. Id. at 173 n.1.
41New York courts previously had refused to alter the general immunity rule which
applied to nonresident plaintiffs, see note 42 supra, notwithstanding its harsh effect on local
defendants. See Petrova v. Roberts, 216 App. Div. 814, 216 N.Y.S. 897 (2d Dep't 1926), aff'd
mem., 245 N.Y. 518, 157 N.E. 841 (1927); Roberts v. Thompson, 149 App. Div. 437, 134
N.Y.S. 363 (4th Dep't 1912).
The constitutionality of a California statute identical in purpose to CPA 227(a) was
sustained by the United States Supreme Court in Adam v. Saenger, 303 U.S. 59 (1938). In
so holding, the Court stated:
There is nothing in the Fourteenth Amendment to prevent a state from adopting a procedure by which a judgment inpersonammay be rendered in a cross-action
against a plaintiff in its courts. . . .The plaintiff having, by his voluntary act...
submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court, there is nothing arbitrary or
unreasonable in treating him as being there for all purposes for which justice to the
defendant requires his presence. It is the price which the state may exact as the
condition of opening its courts to the plaintiff.
Id. at 67-68 (emphasis added); see Frank L. Young Co. v. McNeal-Edwards Co., 283 U.S.
398 (1931); See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAW § 83 (1969);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 21, comment a (1942).
Conditions on the use of a state's facilities are not limited to its court system. The state,
for example, may stipulate that before a foreign corporation may do business in the state, it
must meet certain registration requirements and designate the Secretary of State as the
corporation's agent for service of process. See, e.g., N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAw § 1304 (1972).
Similarly, a condition attached to a nonresident's use of state roadways is the designation of
the Secretary of State for service of process. See VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 253 (1970 & Supp. 19781979). The United States Supreme Court has upheld the constitutionality of such statutes,
declaring that, where the state has a "special interest" in protecting its citizens, regulations
on nonresidents are permissible. See McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220
(1957); Hess v. Palowski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927).
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constitutional issue would be presented if CPLR 303 were interpreted to apply to actions commenced in federal court. "0 Since the
right to utilize the federal courts is protected by the Constitution,"'
and federal courts confer immunity upon parties to their proceedings, "2 it is unclear whether New York could base jurisdiction 6on the
institution of a suit in a federal court located in New York. 3
The result in Rockwood can also be justified on the ground that
CPLR 303 was intended to enable a resident defendant to obtain
jurisdiction over a nonresident plaintiff who purposefully and voluntarily entered the state to institute an action for his own benefit. "4
The assertion of a cross-claim that is essentially defensive in nature,
as was done in Rockwood, should not be considered within the scope
of CPLR 303.5 It is submitted that only cross-claims that are unre-

lated to the main cause of action are sufficiently similar to the
"commencement of an action" to justify application of CPLR 303.6
Audrey Rogers
63 App. Div. 2d at 978, 406 N.Y.S.2d at 107.
61 See Donovan v. City of Dallas, 377 U.S. 408 (1964); Terral v. Burke Constr. Co., 257

U.S. 529 (1922); Markham v. City of Newport News, 292 F.2d 711 (4th Cir. 1961). In Terral,
the Court stated that, "a State may not, in imposing conditions upon [a party], exact from
it a waiver of the exercise of its constitutional right to resort to the federal courts." 257 U.S.
at 532.
62 The federal courts grant immunity as a convenience of the court, based on "their own
notions of fairness and expediency." 2 MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 4.20 (3d ed. 1978); see
Page Co. v. MacDonald, 261 U.S. 446 (1923); Stewart v. Ramsey, 242 U.S. 128 (1916). The
extension of immunity to a party attending federal proceedings is deemed a procedural
regulation and thus it may be neither controlled nor limited by state law. See Marlowe v.
Baird, 301 F.2d 169 (6th Cir. 1962); Hardie v. Bryson, 44 F. Supp. 67 (E.D. Mo. 1942).
Referring to the problems raised by a state asserting jurisdiction over a party who is
attending a federal action, Dean McLaughlin states that the decision reached by the Rockwood court, "avoided a serious constitutional difficulty." CPLR 303, commentary at 70
(Supp. 1978-1979).
" See 1949 REPORT, supra note 57, at 174, 193.
c5 Cf. Green v. Bender, N.Y.L.J., June 15, 1976 at 11, col. 5 (Sup. Ct. Westchester
County), discussed in The Quarterly Survey, 51 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 201, 212 (1976) (counterclaim for Dole apportionment by nonresident third-party defendant defensive in nature and
thus not a predicate for the use of CPLR 303).
CPLR 3019(b) (1972), provides that "[a] cross-claim may be any cause of action in
favor of one or more defendants" against another defendant. See, e.g., A & R Constr. Co. v.
New York State Elec. & Gas Co., 27 App. Div. 2d 899, 278 N.Y.S.2d 165 (3d Dep't 1967)
(mem.); La France Carpets, Inc. v. United States Rubber Co., 19 App. Div. 2d 812, 243
N.Y.S.2d 540 (1st Dep't 1963) (mem).
In contrast, a cross-claim in a federal action must allege a claim that is related to the
transaction that is the subject matter of the primary litigation. FED. R. Civ. P. 13(g). Thus,
they are "ancillary" to the main claim and independent jurisdictional grounds need not be
established. 2 H. KOOMAN, FEDERAL Civm PRAcrIcE § 13.16 at 202 (1969); see, e.g., R.M.
Smythe & Co. v. Chase Nat'l Bank, 291 F.2d 721 (2d Cir. 1961); Glens Falls Indem. Co. v.
United States, 229 F.2d 370 (9th Cir. 1955); United States v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust
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CLASS ACTIONS

CPLR 901: Class action denied in products liability case where
common questions of design defect and misleading advertisingheld
not to predominate over individual questions of causation and
reliance
Enacted in 1975, article 9 of the CPLR expanded the applicability of the class action device in New York and removed certain
judicially imposed barriers to its use.67 Under CPLR 901, a plenary
Co., 231 F. Supp. 160 (S.D.N.Y. 1964). The purpose of allowing ancillary cross-claims is to
expedite the judicial process by determining the rights of all related parties in one action.
See Meisner v. Healey, 18 App. Div. 2d 368, 239 N.Y.S.2d 352 (1st Dep't 1963).
The assertion of an independent cross-claim under CPLR 3019(b) by a person not otherwise subject to personal jurisdiction has been held to constitute a waiver of jurisdictional
defenses. See Goodman v. Solow, 27 App. Div. 2d 920, 279 N.Y.S.2d 377 (1st Dep't) (mem.),
leave to appeal denied, 20 N.Y.2d 646, 231 N.E.2d 789, 285 N.Y.S.2d 1026 (1967). See also
CPLR 320, commentary at 379 (1972 & Supp. 1978-1979). Support for the conclusion that
the assertion of an ancillary cross-claim by a nonresident defendant is ineffective to invoke
jurisdiction under CPLR 303 may be found in the analogous situation where a defendant
asserts a counterclaim that is related to the subject matter of the complaint. The courts have
held that this will not waive a defendant's jurisdictional defenses. See, e.g., Italian Colony
Restaurant, Inc. v. Wershals, 45 App. Div. 2d 841, 358 N.Y.S.2d 448 (2d Dep't 1974) (mem.)
(dicta); M. Katz & Son Billiard Prods., Inc. v. G. Correale & Sons, Inc., 26 App. Div. 2d 52,
270 N.Y.S.2d 672 (1st Dep't 1966), aff'd mem., 20 N.Y.2d 903, 232 N.E.2d 864, 285 N.Y.S.2d
871 (1967).
TENTH ANN. REP. OF THE JUD. CONFERENCE ON THE CPLR (1972), in EIGHTEENTH ANN.
REP. N.Y. JUD. CONFERENCE A27, A35-36 (1973); see EIGHTEENTH ANN. REP. N.Y. JUD. COUNCIL
217, 229-34 (1952). See generally The Survey, 50 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 179, 189 (1975). Article 9
'1

of the CPLR replaced the former class action statute, ch. 308, § 1,[1962] N.Y. LAWS (McKinney) (repealed by ch. 207, § 2, [1975] N.Y. LAWS (McKinney)), which required that privity
exist between class members as a condition for maintaining a class action. See D. SIEGEL,
NEW YORK PRACTICE § 140, at 176-77 (1978); 2 WK&M T 901.02, at 9-6 to 7; Homburger, State
Class Actions and the FederalRule, 71 COLUM. L. REv. 609 (1971), reprintedin TENTH ANN.
REP. OF THE JUD. CONFERENCE ON THE CPLR (1972), in EIGHTEENTH Am. REP. N.Y. JuD.
CONFERENCE 242, 245-48 (1972). Under this provision, the proposed class action had to be
based on a "legal relation or unity of interest among the individual members of the group in
relation to the subject matter of the action or the right asserted, or, at least a community of
interest in relation to the relief.demanded." EIGHTEENTH ANN. REP. N.Y. JuD. CoUNCIL 217,

229 (1952) (Civ. PRAC. Acr. § 195 (renumbered CPLR 1005)). The privity requirement was
included to avoid situations in which non-participating class members would be bound by
a judgment in the absence of a common tie. See Brenner v. Title Guar. & Trust Co., 276
N.Y. 230, 236-37, 11 N.E.2d 890, 893 (1937); Homburger, supra, at 613-17. Thus, the courts
frequently held that "[sleparate wrongs to separate persons, though committed by similar
means and even pursuant to a single plan, do not alone create a common or general interest

in those who are wronged." Hall v. Coburn Corp., 26 N.Y.2d 396, 400, 259 N.E.2d 720, 721,
311 N.Y.S.2d 281, 283 (1970) (quoting Society Milion Athena, Inc. v. National Bank of
Greece, 281 N.Y. 282, 292, 22 N.E.2d 374, 377 (1939); see Richards v. Kaskel, 32 N.Y.2d
524, 300 N.E.2d 388, 347 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1973). The strict construction of the former class

action statute limited its utility to situations involving a common fund or legal relationship
arising from "trusts, partnership, or joint ventures, and ownership of corporate stock."
TENTH ANN. REP. OF Tm JUm. CONFERENCE ON THE CPLR (1972), in EIGHTEENTH ANN. REP.

